ISSUES
: Our Changing Population
Chapter 2: Global population issues
36
As China ends the one-child policy,
what is its legacy?
An article from
The Conversation
.
By Stephanie Gordon, PhD candidate, University of Leicester
C
hina has announced the
end to its infamous one-
child policy, the restrictive
rule that has limited many families
to one child, and some to two
children for the past 37 years. The
changes will allow all couples to
have two children.
China has a long history of
controlling
its
population.
Throughout the 1950s, family
planning was encouraged under
Mao Zedong to promote economic
growth. But only in 1973 did it
become a political priority, with
the national wan, xi, shao – “late
marriage, longer spacing, and fewer
children” campaign encouraging
two children per couple.
In June 1978, a policy of one
child per couple was rigorously
pursued as the Government feared
that China would not be able to
modernise and support a large
population at the same time.
Yet the law was difficult to enforce.
Male children were prized and
families who first gave birth to
a daughter would lack a son to
support them in old age. From 1984
onward, responding to societal
unrest, rural couples whose first
child was a girl were allowed to
conceive a second child.
A series of changes took place
from 2010, after it emerged 13
million children were on record
as being without proof of identity
(
hukou
) because they were denied
birth registration as a result of
family planning policies.
The National Health Ministry and
National Population and Family
Planning
Commission
were
merged in 2013, which signalled
a relaxation of birth control as a
government priority. In November
2013 the state decreed that citizens
were allowed to have two children
if either member of the couple was
an only child themselves. The new
announcement marks the most
radical change of all: two children
allowed for all couples.
Children with no identity
From forced abortions, sterilisation
and astronomical fines, the one-
child policy led to a plethora of
human rights abuses.
From the beginning there were
questions about how best to
enforce it. One way was to charge
citizens who had more than one
child “social compensation fees”,
colloquially referred to as “fines”,
from two to eight times the annual
incomes in rural areas, or annual
disposable income in urban areas.
With the income derived from these
fines, livelihoods and careers of
government staff depended on
charging fees for unauthorised
children. For example, in Henan
Province alone the Population
and Family Planning Commission
employed 17,000 administrators
and 22,000 nursing and technical
staff.
In the early days, mass sterilisations
and abortions were particularly rife
in the early 1980s. As time went
on, great pressure was put on
mothers with one child to accept
an IUD coil, and mothers with two
children to be sterilised. In many
areas children could not have their
birth recorded until this took place.
Mothers and families who could
not afford fines for giving birth
to unauthorised children would
see no choice but to undergo an
abortion.
When births could not be prevented,
then local government could deny
legal identity documentation to
children born without permission.
This was initially a way to hide
unauthorised births. In this way, the
child did not exist on government
records or population statistics.
Even the parents themselves might
prefer to lose out on their child’s
hukou
than be punished for an
unauthorised child.
Over time, as China’s birth rate
decelerated and the population
aged, local governments worried
less about fulfilling birthing
targets. Later on, denial of the
hukou would be used as leverage
