8
ISSUES: Citizenship
Chapter 1: Citizenship in the UK
requirement. Refusals due to delays in
replying to enquiries from UK Visas and
Immigration (UKVI) have risen in recent
years – from 423 in 2013 (6%) to 1,251 in
2015 (12%).
On the other hand, British citizenship
law does not have many
jus sanguinis
characteristics, making it relatively
easy for children born in the UK to
non-British parents to be registered for
British citizenship. British citizenship law
also does not require renunciation of
prior citizenships in order to naturalise.
(Law in the sending nation is relevant
here as well. Zimbabwe, for example,
has not permitted dual citizenship,
probably lowering naturalisation rates for
Zimbabweanmigrants to the UK.)
Research on the individual determinants
of naturalisation – the ways in which
the costs and benefits to individuals
determine their likelihood of naturalising
– has been conducted mainly in North
America and not in the UK (Bloemraad,
2006). A recent European study of
naturalisation identifies nine factors
associated with higher naturalisation
rates.Attheindividuallevel,naturalisation
is more likely for migrants who speak the
destination country’s language, who
have a parent born in the destination
country and who reside longer within
it. In addition, people who came from
a poor or unstable country or from a
former colony of the destination country
are more likely to naturalise. Among the
second generation (children of migrants),
naturalisation seems to be less common
among Muslims than among others.
In the destination country, the study
finds higher naturalisation rates where
citizenship law is relatively permissive
and where net migration rates are low
(Dronkers and Vink, 2010).
For migrants to the UK, the basis for
initial entry also partially determines
the likelihood of naturalising. Migrants
who arrive in the UK with family visas or
as skilled or highly-skilled workers (pre-
PBS equivalents of Tier 1 and Tier 2 visas)
are more likely to naturalise than those
with student visas or temporary work
visas. Students and temporary workers
do not accumulate time toward fulfilling
residency requirements unless they
change their status to a category that is
eligible for naturalisation, for instance
through marriage to a British national or
by obtaining a visa based on longer term
work.
Evidence gaps and
limitations
Administrative data on naturalisations
provide complete and presumably
accurate counts of grants of citizenship
by category of eligibility (residence,
family or registration). The Home Office
compiles figures from a database in
which caseworkers enter information
about each applicant for naturalisation.
Published statistics are generated from
this database.
A minority of applications for citizenship
are refused; these refusals are also
tracked in administrative data, including
the reason for rejection. Some of these
simply fail to meet straightforward
requirements such as lengthof residence;
others
reflect
more
discretionary
judgements, such as the ‘good character’
requirement. In 2008, the Home Office
changed its interpretation of the good
character clause, making it difficult for
people with past criminal convictions to
attain citizenship.
Since naturalisation represents a change
in relationshipbetween an individual and
the Government, trends in naturalisation
reflect not only trends in migration but
also changes in government policy and
administrative practice. Several cases
are discussed in this briefing in which
a change in policy or administrative
practice had noticeable effects on the
number of naturalising citizens in a
given year or period. However, a crucial
limitation is that administrative data on
applications, grants and refusals cannot
show the number of potential citizenship
applications that might be deterred
by added requirements. These include
the 2004 and 2005 changes requiring
a higher standard of English language
proficiency and a demonstration of
knowledge of life in the UK, and the
fees accompanying applications for
settlement, naturalisation, and the Life
in the UK test. Some research attempts
to estimate this deterrent effect (Ryan,
2008), but this requires estimations
based on assumptions and cannot be
counted straightforwardly in the data.
Still, given that some individuals may
not feel capable of passing the required
language and knowledge tests, and
others may have difficulty affording the
fees (particularly families, since fees apply
to each individual), this deterrence could
be an important impact of these policies.
References
Bloemraad, Irene. “Becoming a Citizen in
the United States and Canada: Structured
Mobilization and Immigrant Political
Incorporation.” Social Forces 85, no. 2
(2006): 667-695.
Dronkers, Jaap, and Maarten Vink.
“Explaining Immigrant Citizenship Status:
First and Second Generation Immigrants
in Fifteen European States.” MPRA
Paper No. 26198, Maastricht Research
School of Economics of Technology
and Organization (METEOR), Maastricht
University, 2010. Accessed 9 November
2010.
.
de/26198/
Home
Office.
“British
Citizenship
Statistics, United Kingdom, 2009.”
Statistical Bulletin, Home Office, London,
2010.
Home Office. “Immigration Statistics,
October to December 2014.” London:
Home Office, 2015.
Home Office. “User Guide to Home Office
Immigration Statistics”, updated May 26,
2016.
Janoski, Thomas. The Ironies of
Citizenship:
Naturalization
and
Integration in Industrialized Countries.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010.
Ryan,
Bernard.
“Integration
Requirements: ANewModel inMigration
Law.” Journal of Immigration Asylum and
Nationality Law 22, no. 4 (2008): 303-316.
Sawyer, Caroline. “EUDO Citizenship
Observatory Country Report: United
Kingdom.” Florence: European University
Institute, 2009. Accessed 9 November
2010.
/
hand l e /1814 /19 6 42 / Un i t e d%20
Kingdom2.pdf?sequence=2
Further reading
Brubaker, R. Citizenship and Nationhood
in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992.
Yang, P. Q. “Explaining Immigrant
Naturalization.” International Migration
Review 28, no. 3 (1994): 449-477.
8 August 2016
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The above information is reprinted
with kind permission from The
Migration Observatory. Please
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